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Active resistance would, of course, be
the antithesis of active encouragement,
but explicit examples of what this might
mean are harder to develop. Both active
encouragement and passive acceptance
are strategies that can be unilaterally pur-
sued by issuing nations (by granting
access to domestic institutions or by
choosing benign neglect). However,
without resorting to strict capital controls
that effectively shut down international
currency circulation, an issuing country
has limited power to impose its will on
another sovereign nation. Nonetheless,
modern economies operate under the
umbrella of a broad set of cooperative
arrangements, and this interconnected-
ness can provide substantial leverage for
a country that is truly intent on inhibiting
the adoption of its currency elsewhere.
The European Central Bank (ECB) is a
case in point. As ECB President Wim
Duisenberg indicated in November
2001, the ECB has decided it would
rather not see “euroization” at this time,
at least among those countries that might
one day join the monetary union:
“[Unilateral] adoption of the euro out-
side the [Maastricht] Treaty process
would not be welcome as it would run
counter to the important process of con-
vergence prior to the adoption of the
euro outlined in the Treaty.”
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Should the United States care if
other countries abandon their own
currencies and adopt the dollar?
Dollarization imparts benefits to the
United States as well as costs, and
these ought to be weighed as we
decide what to do about the growing
number of countries turning to dol-
larization or considering it.
In January of this year, the Argentine
currency board, which had tied
Argentina’s peso to the U.S. dollar since
April 1991, was dismantled, ending one
of the best-known and important recent
examples of a nation foregoing indepen-
dent monetary policy as a strategy for
promoting economic welfare. A year
before the currency board’s demise,
public discussion of Argentina’s mone-
tary arrangements had focused on 
moving in just the opposite direction:
Eliminating peso monetary liabilities
altogether, and fully dollarizing the
Argentine monetary system.
That the discussion even took place in
the face of severe (and thus far, unre-
solved) strains on the Argentine econ-
omy is testament to the powerful allure
of dollarization. In fact, despite
Argentina’s withdrawal from the group,
there are currently 17 countries that
have effectively adopted another’s 
currency for their own, and another 
17 with currency board or dual mone-
tary arrangements. (For a list of these
countries, see Cohen 2001 in the recom-
mended reading.)
That Argentina has, thus far, chosen to
reverse course and abandon its currency
board arrangement bears witness to the
unsettled questions that surround dollar-
ization. In fact, a definitive assessment of
the costs and benefits of dollarization has
proven elusive, and consequently, the
debate over its pros and cons continues.
Most of this debate centers on the ques-
tion of whether dollarization is desirable
for the adopting country: Should
Argentina (or Ecuador, El Salvador,
Mexico, or wherever) forego the creation
and circulation of its own independent
currency and make the dollar the nation’s
legal tender? Much less attention, 
however, has been paid to the question 
of dollarization from the perspective of
the issuing country: Is dollarization in 
the interest of the United States? It is
with this question that this Economic
Commentary is concerned.
■ What’s a Country to Do?
For purposes of general discussion, we
can think of three potential responses a
country might take when others attempt
to adopt its currency. (Although I will
specifically refer to “euroization” in a
few paragraphs, throughout most of this
article I will generically refer to the
adoption of another country’s currency
as dollarization. It will be clear, however,
that most of the issues I raise are not spe-
cific to the dollar and the United States.) 
The three responses are passive accep-
tance, active encouragement, and active
resistance. The attitudes represented by
each of these responses are just as the
labels imply. Passive acceptance neither
encourages nor discourages currency
adoption. While a country following
such a policy would do nothing to make
dollarization more difficult, it also would
do nothing to subsidize or otherwise
make dollarization more attractive to the
adopting economies. Currently, passive
acceptance would be the best description
of U.S. policy toward dollarization. 
Specific concessions to dollarizing 
countries, on the other hand, would be
the central characteristic of active
encouragement. The most straightfor-
ward example might be an explicit
arrangement to share seigniorage 
revenues—the implicit tax associated
with creating money—with the adopting
country. In principle, however, conces-
sions that could make dollarization more
attractive run the gamut of central bank
services, from providing settlement
accounts and lender-of-last-resort facili-
ties to foreign-based depository institu-
tions, to allowing foreign representatives
to participate directly in policy decisions. In this case, countries’desire to join the
monetary union gives the ECB consid-
erable influence on decisions regarding
adoption of the euro.
It should be clear that countries have a
choice to make when others find their
currencies worth adopting. As the 
differing attitudes in the United States
and the euro monetary union illustrate,
conclusions regarding the best choice
are not uniform or obvious. For that
reason, considering dollarization’s pros
and cons from the vantage of the issuing
country is a useful exercise.  
■ Seigniorage: The Usual
Suspect
The direct benefit of dollarization to the
issuing economy is pretty straightfor-
ward. When another country replaces its
currency with dollars (or assets denomi-
nated in dollars), it ultimately can obtain
those dollar assets only by “buying”
them with its own exports of goods and
services. Because it costs the U.S. 
government essentially nothing to create
dollars, this is a pure gain to the U.S.
economy. In effect, the U.S. government
levies a tax—called “seigniorage”—
that other countries pay for the privilege
of using the dollar as their own cur-
rency. As such, dollarizing (or expand-
ing the quantity of dollars in an already
dollarized economy) is a direct cost to
the dollarizing country.
Alleviating these costs presents an obvi-
ous avenue by which a country might
encourage broader adoption of its cur-
rency. Because the seigniorage revenues
collected by the issuing country are a
tax on the adopting country, we don’t
have to go much beyond basic princi-
ples of economics to argue that reducing
the tax rate would make it more attrac-
tive to dollarize. If, for whatever reason,
the ability to recover some amount of
lost seigniorage is the difference
between a country adopting another’s
currency or not, then the issuing country
gains revenue for any rebate that is less
than 100 percent. If revenue gains are
the primary benefit of dollarization from
the issuing country’s point of view, then
some is better than none, and everyone
can seemingly win from a seigniorage-
sharing agreement.   
How big might these benefits be? To get
some sense of the answer to this ques-
tion, let’s consider the case of the
United States as the issuing country and
Mexico and the countries of South
America as the adopting countries.
Based on the average annual value of
changes in the monetary base in these
countries between 1990 and 20001—
which would determine the value of
seigniorage if newly created dollars
were to replace the growth in domestic
currencies—the revenue gain to the
United States would be somewhere in
the range of 0.2 percent to 0.8 percent of
gross domestic product (GDP) per year. 
This number is not small relative to the
typical estimates of seigniorage revenues
in the United States, which generally 
fall in the lower end of this range. 
Furthermore, this calculation represents
an annual flow of revenues. At the time 
a country initially converts to another’s
currency, there is, in addition, a one-time
windfall to the issuing country as the
adopting country replaces its existing
money supply with dollars (or euros, 
or whatever). 
On the other hand, partial and (in the
case of Ecuador) complete dollarization
is already a fact in many of these 
countries, implying that the marginal
gains in seigniorage are lower than the
numbers above suggest. The gain is
reduced yet further if broader adoption
of the dollar requires revenue-sharing
arrangements. All of this suggests the
total benefits in seigniorage revenues
would be quite small relative to the 
18 to 20 percent of GDP collected in
explicit tax revenues by the federal 
government each year. 
The fact that seigniorage revenues are
small does not, of course, close the issue.
Even minimal gains in revenues can be
justified if the costs are correspondingly
small. In addition, there are certainly
other, less direct, benefits and costs to con-
sider. To these possibilities, we turn next.
■ Win–Win: Exchange Rate
Risk, Trade, and Credibility 
After seigniorage, the next obvious place
to look for potential benefits of dollariza-
tion is suggested by the theory of optimal
currency areas (an idea for which econo-
mist Robert Mundell won the 2000 Nobel
Prize for Economic Science). Countries
that qualify as optimal currency areas are
those for whom the benefits of using a
single currency equal or exceed the costs.
A little introspection should make the
potential benefits clear. Suppose your
favorite grocery store accepted only
Japanese yen. Every trip to the grocery
store would require converting your 
dollars into yen. This circumstance
would cause no great practical diffi-
culty: The debit or credit card machine
at the counter could make all the neces-
sary adjustments for you. In fact, if 
the exchange rate between the yen and
the dollar were always the same, the
dual-currency system would pose very
little problem at all. 
But what if the dollar–yen exchange rate
fluctuated over time? Even if the yen
prices of your grocery items were con-
stant, the uncertain value of the dollar
would turn your shopping trip into a
financial adventure. On top of every-
thing else you have to worry about,
exchange risk has now been added to
the equation.
The elimination of exchange rate risk is
a likely explanation for evidence—see
the recommended reading—that a
shared currency enhances the flow of
goods and services across borders. To 
be sure, this doesn’t mean that moving
to a common money will guarantee
trade expansion, and it may well be 
that expanded trade leads to currency
union, and not vice versa (as argued, for
instance, in the recommended article by
Alberto Trejos). But for our purposes,
it’s not clear that this distinction is really
important. What is important is the 
following: If a country dollarizes to
facilitate trade by reducing exchange
rate risk, the benefits of reduced risk 
and expanded trade accrue to the U.S.
economy as well. 
Some may argue, however, that the most
important benefits of dollarization are
not about trade as much as they are
about financial stability. In this view of
things, the real benefit of dollarization—
especially to smaller developing
economies with mixed policy records—
is credibility in the commitment to low
and relatively stable rates of inflation
(credibility that follows because the 
dollarizing country no longer maintains
the capacity to create too much money).
For countries that lack a record of 
monetary stability, buying this type 
of credibility can reduce the cost of 
borrowing, reduce nominal exchange
rate volatility (which may, of course,
stimulate trade), and reduce the likeli-
hood of speculative attack. 
If these arguments are correct, dollariz-
ing countries would not be the only ben-
eficiaries. As the events in Southeast
Asia in 1997 and Russia and Brazil in
1998 amply demonstrated, a countrydoes not have to be large or be a major
trading partner for instability to affect
global financial markets, and hence
U.S. policy. If dollarization mitigates
the probability of such instability, dol-
larization is a benefit to the United
States as well. 
■ Lose–Lose: Destabilizing
Dollarization?
The benefits just described, of course,
depend critically on dollarization having
a stabilizing influence on the adopting
country. One downside for a country
that adopts another’s currency—the cost
side of currency unification—is the loss
of an independent monetary policy. If a
country foregoes issuing its own money,
then it essentially inherits the monetary
policy of the currency union or issuing
country’s central bank. At any given
time, that policy may not be the one that
would be chosen as optimal if the coun-
try were monetarily independent. 
This may be a small price to pay if the
loss of monetary independence yields
benefits in the form of lower inflation
and more stable financial markets. But in
extreme cases, the lack of flexibility may
result in economic stress that otherwise
might be avoided with a more tailored
monetary response. Some believe that
Argentina is a case in point. The argu-
ment goes like this: By rigidly tying the
peso to the dollar (and, in effect, dollariz-
ing), the Argentine economy suffered
greater exposure to adverse develop-
ments in the Brazilian economy, a large
and important trading partner. 
I am not wholly convinced this 
argument paints the full picture of
Argentina’s woes, or that moving away
from dollarization was the best long-
run response—see, for example, my
Commentary on stable money refer-
enced below. Nonetheless, there is a 
serious case to be made for the position
that a lack of policy flexibility can 
exacerbate weaknesses that already
exist in an economy. In the worst-case
scenarios, being tied to an inadequate
or perverse policy course has the poten-
tial of turning a slowdown into a 
prolonged crisis. 
But the bottom line of both the win–win
and lose–lose scenarios is as follows: If
dollarization is beneficial to the adopt-
ing country, it is hard to see how it can
fail to benefit the issuing country. If
dollarization is destabilizing or harmful
to the adopting country, it is hard to see
how it can benefit the issuing country.
Most economic arguments lead us to the
conclusion that the interests of the
adopter and the adoptee are aligned.   
■ Not All Politics Are Local
There is one set of issues, however, that
would appear to be of practical impor-
tance to the issuing country alone. A
surge of final settlement in dollars, for
example, may complicate money-
supply management for the Federal
Reserve.  Or it is conceivable that the
network of relationships between 
foreign financial institutions and U.S.
banks would dramatically expand,
increasing the exposure of the U.S.
banking system to international devel-
opments and bringing new and poten-
tially complicated issues for U.S. regu-
lators. But these sorts of problems are
not unique to questions of dollarization.
They are not different from the issues
that policymakers must, in any event,
grapple with in an increasingly com-
plex, interdependent world. 
The unique set of questions that dollar-
ization may raise is likely to comprise
those that are as much political as eco-
nomic. One common concern is that
dollarization would heighten domestic
policymakers’sense of responsibility 
for the performance of dollarized
economies, creating a tension between
domestic interests and foreign interests.
Clearly, a policy of active encourage-
ment raises issues of governance and
participation in the policymaking
process: Access to settlement accounts
at the issuing country’s central bank,
coverage under lender-of-last-resort
arrangements, and even a direct role for
the adopting countries in the operation
and implementation of policy could be
on the table. (In fact, some may argue
that, because the adoption of a foreign
currency introduces taxation through
seigniorage, active encouragement of
dollarization would bring with it some
responsibility to broaden the representa-
tion of the adopting countries in the
development and implementation
phases of policy.)  
These issues are certain to arise with
active encouragement, but it is conceiv-
able they could develop even with 
passive acceptance of dollarization. 
If increasing dollarization does in fact
change the exposure of the domestic
financial system qualitatively, there will
be a strong argument in favor of bring-
ing the regulatory and supervisory 
apparatus of the issuing country to bear
on the financial institutions of the
adoptees. At that point, all of the ques-
tions invoked by an active encourage-
ment policy bubble to the surface.  
Perhaps these possibilities are enough to
push some from advocating passive
acceptance toward favoring active resis-
tance, particularly in the form adopted
by the ECB. The current leadership of
the ECB clearly prefers that before
countries adopt the euro, they conform
to the full set of standards outlined in
the Maastrict Treaty, which brought the
European Monetary Union into being.
The Maastricht provisions are intended
to bring the legal, regulatory, and
macroeconomic policy institutions of
monetary union members into confor-
mity with standards (such as low
deficits) that maximize the probability
that the union will be stable, credible,
and contribute to general economic 
welfare. Unilateral “euroization” in this
view is unacceptably costly, to the
extent that it impedes such reforms.
Active resistance, then, becomes lever-
age that promotes desirable long-run
institutional reform among potential
adoptees.  
■ Good News and Bad News
In a world of ever-increasing economic
integration (a wholly salutary develop-
ment), the issue of common currency
arrangements between sovereign
nations will arise with increasing fre-
quency. To date, most of the focus has
been on the costs and benefits to dollar-
izing nations. However, if more and
more adopting countries find that the
benefits exceed the costs, interest in the
costs and benefits to issuing countries
will inevitably expand. The good news
is that much of the thought and
research on the purely economic costs
and benefits to adopting countries
appears to be readily transferable to the
case of adoptee countries. The bad
news is that political judgments and
institutions must inevitably come into
play. Economic reasoning is not mute
on such topics, but it is surely a long
way from sufficient to the task.     
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